Long Island Jewish Medical Center

merged in 1997 and now form the third largest not-for-profit academic health care system in the United States. The authors analyze the specific factors responsible for the relative success of the clinical merger, review their merger’s initial failures and how they crafted a more pragmatic and appropriate set of guiding principles to continue the merger, and discuss the future of their institution’s clinical integration strategy. In 2000, clinical integration of the 19 clinical departments at the two merged institutions was surveyed across five broad areas: conferences, residency programs, common faculty and support staff, finances, and research. Extents of clinical integration ranged from 20 % to 72%. Six departments had more than 50 % clinical integration, and overall clinical integration was 42%. Not surprisingly, clinical integration had occurred most frequently with conferences (50%) and least with finances (25%). The single-chairperson model for department leadership has been most successful in achieving significant clinical integration of the formerly separate departments. The relative success of the clinical merger has been guided by the principle that no clinical service should be integrated simply for the sake of merging, but rather that integration should be encouraged where and when it makes sense to achieve specific program goals. In addition, the merger would not have proceeded without constant communication among the leadership and staff, flexibility in building leadership models, patience in having events progress over a time course that developed trust among the senior leaders, and the presence of a senior executive structure whose authority to make decisions is accepted. The most important factor for achieving a reasonable level of clinical integration is the ability of the clinical leaders to collaborate and lead the change process. In 1997, after a nine-month legal challenge by the United State