A network payoff function assigns a utility to all participants in a (social) net-work. In this paper we discuss properties of such network payoff functions that guarantee the existence of certain types of pairwise stable networks and the con-vergence of certain network formation processes. In particular we investigate network payoff functions that admit an exact network potential or an ordinal network potential. We relate these network potentials to exact and ordinal po-tentials of a non-cooperative network formation game based on consent in link formation. Our main results extend and strengthen the current insights in the literature on game theoretic approaches to social network formation
Network structure has a significant role in determining the outcomes of many socioeconomic relations...
Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simult...
This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual ...
We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on indivi...
We consider game theoretic models of social network formation.In this paper we limit our investigati...
We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of forming links are publicly known but an i...
This paper presents a game-theoretic approach that models the formation of signed networks which con...
This paper examines a normal form game of network formation due to Myerson (Game theory: analysis o...
The role of social-relationship network structures has been studied in many economic sit-uations and...
We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not di...
This paper investigates the strategic interaction effects that precede network formation. We find th...
International audienceThis paper develops a framework for studying social network formation. Partly ...
We introduce a game theoretic model of network formation in an effort to understand the complex syst...
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, includ...
Abstract. Classical network-formation games are played on a directed graph. Players have reachabilit...
Network structure has a significant role in determining the outcomes of many socioeconomic relations...
Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simult...
This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual ...
We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on indivi...
We consider game theoretic models of social network formation.In this paper we limit our investigati...
We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of forming links are publicly known but an i...
This paper presents a game-theoretic approach that models the formation of signed networks which con...
This paper examines a normal form game of network formation due to Myerson (Game theory: analysis o...
The role of social-relationship network structures has been studied in many economic sit-uations and...
We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not di...
This paper investigates the strategic interaction effects that precede network formation. We find th...
International audienceThis paper develops a framework for studying social network formation. Partly ...
We introduce a game theoretic model of network formation in an effort to understand the complex syst...
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, includ...
Abstract. Classical network-formation games are played on a directed graph. Players have reachabilit...
Network structure has a significant role in determining the outcomes of many socioeconomic relations...
Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simult...
This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual ...