In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability
In multiparty parliamentary democracies government coalitions frequently reshuffle the allocation of...
Most models of the formation of political coalitions use either Euclidean spaces or rely purely on g...
The majority of the world's advanced industrial democracies are parliamentary systems, and in most o...
this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parl...
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government for-mation in multi-party ...
peer reviewedA standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non-cooperative game is th...
That neither the assumptions nor the predictions of standard government formation models entirely co...
This paper questions results that claim to extend non-cooperative models of bargaining in legislatur...
International audienceIn this paper, we apply bargaining theory to a certain model of coalition form...
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party p...
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where...
This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems that incorporates electoral, government format...
Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governmen...
Models of government formation processes in multi-party democracies are unusually highly sensitive t...
Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic mode...
In multiparty parliamentary democracies government coalitions frequently reshuffle the allocation of...
Most models of the formation of political coalitions use either Euclidean spaces or rely purely on g...
The majority of the world's advanced industrial democracies are parliamentary systems, and in most o...
this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parl...
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government for-mation in multi-party ...
peer reviewedA standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non-cooperative game is th...
That neither the assumptions nor the predictions of standard government formation models entirely co...
This paper questions results that claim to extend non-cooperative models of bargaining in legislatur...
International audienceIn this paper, we apply bargaining theory to a certain model of coalition form...
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party p...
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where...
This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems that incorporates electoral, government format...
Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governmen...
Models of government formation processes in multi-party democracies are unusually highly sensitive t...
Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic mode...
In multiparty parliamentary democracies government coalitions frequently reshuffle the allocation of...
Most models of the formation of political coalitions use either Euclidean spaces or rely purely on g...
The majority of the world's advanced industrial democracies are parliamentary systems, and in most o...
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