Corporate Tax Systems and the Location of Industry

This paper analyzes the effects of different corporate tax systems on the location of industry within an economic geography model with regional size asymmetries. Both the North and the South gain indus-try by adopting a tax regime that produces the lowest tax level. As the share of expenditures in the North increases, the Nash equilibrium has this region setting regressive taxes, while the South introduces progressive taxation. The unilateral welfare-maximizing tax structure in the North (South) is the regressive (progressive) system when ex-penditures in the North increase. Welfare in the North (South) is however maximized if both regions set regressive (progressive) taxes, while regressive (progressive) taxation in both regions represents a joint welfare maximizing outcome if the economic size of the North is higher (lower) than a certain threshold value. As trade is liberalized, the equilibrium tax regime adopted depends on how profits respond to lower trade costs. Proportional taxation is never an equilibrium, neither as regional spending changes, nor as trade is liberalized