Add to ORKGAbstract. This paper concerns the design of a trading mechanism for a group of traders when their valuations of the good are private information and they bargain over who shall consume more than his initial endowment and who shall consume less. Tt is shown that there generally exists a set of initial endowments of the traded commodity such that it is possible to design a trading mechanism which is incentive compatible, individually rationai and ex post efficient. JEL Classification No: 02
We study a network of buyers and sellers where each seller owns an indivisible object and has no inc...
It is generally impossible to design an ex post efficient mechanism for bilateral trading when the t...
We consider the class of Bayesian environments with one-dimensional private signals and interdepende...
This paper studies a bilateral trading setting where the two agents are not ex-ante identified, in t...
This paper studies a bilateral trading setting where the two agents are not ex-ante identified, in t...
We consider a bilateral trade model in which both players have a finite number of possible valuation...
Allocation and exchange of discrete resources such as kidneys, school seats, and many other resource...
We introduce naive traders in bilateral trading. These traders report their true types in direct mec...
This paper constructs a concrete mechanism/auction to explore the consequence of imposing the ex pos...
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information bef...
We study trading situations in which several principals on one side of the market compete to serve p...
We study a trading problem in which the seller of an indivisible object races at least two potential...
88 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998.In a model of bilateral trade ...
We address robust mechanism design for bilateral trade of an indivisible commodity, under incomplete...
We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller’s v...
We study a network of buyers and sellers where each seller owns an indivisible object and has no inc...
It is generally impossible to design an ex post efficient mechanism for bilateral trading when the t...
We consider the class of Bayesian environments with one-dimensional private signals and interdepende...
This paper studies a bilateral trading setting where the two agents are not ex-ante identified, in t...
This paper studies a bilateral trading setting where the two agents are not ex-ante identified, in t...
We consider a bilateral trade model in which both players have a finite number of possible valuation...
Allocation and exchange of discrete resources such as kidneys, school seats, and many other resource...
We introduce naive traders in bilateral trading. These traders report their true types in direct mec...
This paper constructs a concrete mechanism/auction to explore the consequence of imposing the ex pos...
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information bef...
We study trading situations in which several principals on one side of the market compete to serve p...
We study a trading problem in which the seller of an indivisible object races at least two potential...
88 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998.In a model of bilateral trade ...
We address robust mechanism design for bilateral trade of an indivisible commodity, under incomplete...
We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller’s v...
We study a network of buyers and sellers where each seller owns an indivisible object and has no inc...
It is generally impossible to design an ex post efficient mechanism for bilateral trading when the t...
We consider the class of Bayesian environments with one-dimensional private signals and interdepende...