Axel Tiesen, writing in a journal article in 1914, lamented the fact that although ‘we have reached the point where products of your mind, whether literary, musical, artistic or inventive have been invested with the legal quality of property’, life, being the source from which ‘all other values spring’, has no property value. This essay wants to take a step back from Tiesen’s article and ask the more fundamental question of whether life can be considered as property. Tiesen’s lamentation that life, despite being the source from which ‘all other values spring’, has, by itself, no property value is true insofar as he is thinking about life as being private property. In a by-gone religious age, life was a divine property and in a post-religiou...
Private property ordinarily triggers notions of individual rights, not social obligations. The core ...
Do property owners owe obligations to members of future generations? Although the question can be re...
It is surprisingly difficult to justify private property. Two questions are at stake: (a) a metaphys...
Property theorists commonly suppose that property has as its ends certain private values, such as in...
Human flourishing and human dignity are not empty phrases. They have real content, and they matter i...
The relationship between property and morality has been obscured by three elements in our intellectu...
This chapter asks the question: what happens when the state’s form of legalism no longer recognizes ...
The means by which property organizes human behavior and social life is the subject of profound and ...
In both his article Property as the Law of Things and his prior work, Professor Henry Smith has revi...
No account of property law can achieve a comprehensive understanding without factoring in natural ri...
This essay addresses the vexing question of whether property enhances freedom. Contemporary propert...
While theory offers important insights into property\u27s normative content, it sometimes fails to t...
Notwithstanding its importance, property law has eluded both a consistent definition and a unified c...
Legal philosophers and property scholars sometimes disagree over one or more of the following: the m...
While theory offers important insights into property’s normative content, it sometimes fails to tell...
Private property ordinarily triggers notions of individual rights, not social obligations. The core ...
Do property owners owe obligations to members of future generations? Although the question can be re...
It is surprisingly difficult to justify private property. Two questions are at stake: (a) a metaphys...
Property theorists commonly suppose that property has as its ends certain private values, such as in...
Human flourishing and human dignity are not empty phrases. They have real content, and they matter i...
The relationship between property and morality has been obscured by three elements in our intellectu...
This chapter asks the question: what happens when the state’s form of legalism no longer recognizes ...
The means by which property organizes human behavior and social life is the subject of profound and ...
In both his article Property as the Law of Things and his prior work, Professor Henry Smith has revi...
No account of property law can achieve a comprehensive understanding without factoring in natural ri...
This essay addresses the vexing question of whether property enhances freedom. Contemporary propert...
While theory offers important insights into property\u27s normative content, it sometimes fails to t...
Notwithstanding its importance, property law has eluded both a consistent definition and a unified c...
Legal philosophers and property scholars sometimes disagree over one or more of the following: the m...
While theory offers important insights into property’s normative content, it sometimes fails to tell...
Private property ordinarily triggers notions of individual rights, not social obligations. The core ...
Do property owners owe obligations to members of future generations? Although the question can be re...
It is surprisingly difficult to justify private property. Two questions are at stake: (a) a metaphys...