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Cash transfers are widely used in developed countries as a means of providing income support to the less well-off. In developing countries the absence of reliable income data makes targeting of such transfers very difficult. Nevertheless some developing countries have chosen to distribute cash transfers as a way of compensating the poor for various adverse events. This paper studies the 2005 Indonesian BLT (Bantuan Langsung Tunai, Direct Cash Assistance) program. BLT was implemented contemporaneously with a reduction in fuel subsidies which resulted in an immediate 186 % increase in the price of kerosene. For six months following the program poor households received a payment equivalent to approximately 22 % of their average monthly expenditure. Although the program likely reduced poverty, dissatisfaction with the program’s targeting led to significant social unrest. We find that the extent of leakage of funds to the non-poor within a village is significantly and positively associated with an increase in village crime. There is also evidence of declines in social capital in the village and an associated decline in confidence in village administration