Inducing aspect-experiences – the sudden seeing of something anew, as when a face suddenly strikes us as familiar – can be used as a philosophical method. In seeing aspects, I argue, we let ourselves experience what it would be like to conceptualize something in a particular way, apart from any conceptual routine. We can use that experience to examine our ways of conceptualizing things, and re-evaluate the ways we make sense of them. I claim that we are not always passive with regard to these experiences, and explain how we can actively induce them. I distinguish this method from other standard Wittgensteinian philosophical methods
I propose to develop a phenomenologically-informed ontological model of the subject of experiences. ...
This article focuses on two largely ignored aspects of the understanding of strong metaphors: the vi...
This peer-reviewed paper investigates the dominant underlying approach to aesthetic experience and c...
Philosophy of Psychology was an area of major concern and interest for Wittgenstein in the final yea...
I argue that the typical Wittgensteinian method of philosophical investigation cannot help elucidate...
Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it wou...
In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein's aim in the aspect-perception passages is to critically eva...
Aspectual shape is widely recognized property of intentionality. This means that subject’s access to...
Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it wou...
The diploma thesis offers an outline of the progression of thinking about metaphor and at the same t...
In the great tradition of philosophy, the notion of various modes of perception has been widely reco...
The seeing-as discussion in Philosophical Investigations Part II is typical of Wittgenstein\u27s l...
A new philosophy of nature is urgently needed. The received ontological view, physicalism, is unable...
What method should we use to determine the nature of perceptual experience? My focus here is the Kan...
According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hol...
I propose to develop a phenomenologically-informed ontological model of the subject of experiences. ...
This article focuses on two largely ignored aspects of the understanding of strong metaphors: the vi...
This peer-reviewed paper investigates the dominant underlying approach to aesthetic experience and c...
Philosophy of Psychology was an area of major concern and interest for Wittgenstein in the final yea...
I argue that the typical Wittgensteinian method of philosophical investigation cannot help elucidate...
Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it wou...
In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein's aim in the aspect-perception passages is to critically eva...
Aspectual shape is widely recognized property of intentionality. This means that subject’s access to...
Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it wou...
The diploma thesis offers an outline of the progression of thinking about metaphor and at the same t...
In the great tradition of philosophy, the notion of various modes of perception has been widely reco...
The seeing-as discussion in Philosophical Investigations Part II is typical of Wittgenstein\u27s l...
A new philosophy of nature is urgently needed. The received ontological view, physicalism, is unable...
What method should we use to determine the nature of perceptual experience? My focus here is the Kan...
According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hol...
I propose to develop a phenomenologically-informed ontological model of the subject of experiences. ...
This article focuses on two largely ignored aspects of the understanding of strong metaphors: the vi...
This peer-reviewed paper investigates the dominant underlying approach to aesthetic experience and c...