Constituted Simples?

Many philosophers maintain that two (or more) material objects can occupy the same place at the same time. In such cases, they say, one of the objects “constitutes ” the other without being identical to it. For instance, lumps of marble constitute statues; pieces of plastic constitute driver’s licenses; our bodies constitute us. The numerical distinctness is secured by difference in modal properties. This view may appear to lead to an absurdity. Suppose a statue weighs 150 pounds. So does the lump of marble with which it coincides. If they are numerically distinct, we should expect the scale to read 300 when they are both on it. But it reads 150. There is a common and straightforward response to this charge, however (e.g. Lowe 2003, 156). According to constitutionalism, statue and lump have the same proper parts (at least “at one level of decomposition”). So it is no stranger that the scale reads 150 when they are both on it than that the statue’s top-half does not contribute any weight to the scale in addition to what the statue has already provided. No shared part should be counted more than once. Constitutionalists tend to say that, whereas the piece of marble could have existed without ever coinciding with an artwork, the statue is essentially an artwork. The view, then, is