Basic intrinsic value

When called upon to tell us what hedonism is, moral philosophers often start out by contradicting themselves. An extreme and blatant case would look like this: Hedonism: the view that (i) pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good, and (ii) pain is the only thing that is intrinsically bad; furthermore, the view that (iii) a complex thing such as a life, a possible world, or a total consequence of an action is intrinsically good iff it contains more pleasure than pain. The contradiction seems obvious, but since so many philosophers evidently don’t see it, perhaps it will be useful to employ the sledge hammer. According to the first clause, pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good. This implies that nothing distinct from pleasure is intrinsically good. Since pleasure (whatever precisely it may be) cannot be identified with any life or with any possible world, it would follow that no life or possible world is intrinsically good. Yet, according to the third clause, complex things such as lives and possible worlds are also intrinsically good when they contain a favorable balance of pleasure over pain. You cannot have it both ways: either (a) pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good (in which case no lives and no pos-sible worlds are intrinsically good), or else (b) some lives and some worlds are intrinsically good (in which case pleasure is not the only thing that is intrinsically good). I claimed that many philosophers have contradicted themselves in this way. I will cite two prominent examples