Motivations and observed behavior: evidence from ultimatum bargaining experiment

The research question of this paper is whether it is correct to interpret “prosocial ” decisions revealed in the economic experiments (cooperation, trust, reciprocity, fairness, equity, inequality aversion) as indubitable evidence of prosocial motivational presentations or of prosocial considerations. It is argued that such decisions could be determined by strong economic selfishness. In this case people consider a partner of economic interaction as possible situational constraint, restrictive factor or as possible instrument for satisfying their own selfish interests. When decisions are made on the basis of these considerations the decision could look as prosocial, but in these considerations could be absent any care about interests of the others or about balance of interests of me and other. The results of presented here ultimatum bargaining experiments showed that “fair”, “equitable ” decisions of the bargaining players were determined rather by selfish motivation to maximize their gain in the given perceived restrictions of the situation than by care about balance of party’s interests. So, observed prosocial decisions don’t refute the selfishness axiom. It is also concluded that researchers should assume plural considerations and polymotivation of economic decisions, should use more sensitive and direct techniques for their measurement and should analyse in economic experiments a distribution of the different kinds of considerations and motivation