Add to ORKGThis paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a selection of Myerson’s ([25]) communication equilibrium. A communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game, after every history of messages of the mediator. We provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto...
We investigate infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. We focus on a class of g...
Correlated equilibria (in the sense of Aumann, i.e., normal form correlated equilibria) are studied ...
This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated g...
This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated g...
We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-gam...
We show that any correlated equilibrium payoff of two-player repeated games with imperfect monitorin...
This dissertation studies private information in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. For this ...
We provide simple sufficient conditions for the existence of a tight, recursive upper bound on the s...
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate the...
This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is ...
We study repeated games with discounting where perfect monitoring is possible, but costly. It is sho...
We present a brief overview of recent developments on discounted repeated games with (imperfect) pri...
This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the players are uncertain b...
This note presents three results on repeated games. First, players can be better off with imperfect ...
We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto...
We investigate infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. We focus on a class of g...
Correlated equilibria (in the sense of Aumann, i.e., normal form correlated equilibria) are studied ...
This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated g...
This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated g...
We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-gam...
We show that any correlated equilibrium payoff of two-player repeated games with imperfect monitorin...
This dissertation studies private information in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. For this ...
We provide simple sufficient conditions for the existence of a tight, recursive upper bound on the s...
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate the...
This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is ...
We study repeated games with discounting where perfect monitoring is possible, but costly. It is sho...
We present a brief overview of recent developments on discounted repeated games with (imperfect) pri...
This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the players are uncertain b...
This note presents three results on repeated games. First, players can be better off with imperfect ...
We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto...
We investigate infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. We focus on a class of g...
Correlated equilibria (in the sense of Aumann, i.e., normal form correlated equilibria) are studied ...