How does the marriage market clear? An

Aloysius Siow University of Toronto Abstract. The paper surveys the Choo and Siow (2006a; CS) marriage matching model and its extensions. CS derives a behavioural marriage-matching function. The collec-tive model of intra-household allocations can be integrated into this framework. Spousal labour supplies respond to changing marriage market conditions. Marriage market tight-ness, the ratio of unmarried type i men to unmarried type j women is a sufficient statistic for marriage market conditions for those types of individuals. The hypothesis that spousal labour supplies vary to equilibrate the marriage market has overidentifying restrictions. The framework extends to a dynamic marriage-matching environment. Empirically, this paper shows how the famine caused by the great leap forward in Sichuan affected the marital behaviour of famine-born cohorts. Marriage market tightness is shown to be a useful statistic for summarizing marriage market conditions in the United States. Marriage market conditions in the contemporary United States primarily affect spousal labour force participation rather than hours of work. Comment est-ce que le marche ́ du mariage s’équilibre? Un cadre d’analyse empirique. Ce texte examine le modèle de Choo et Siow et ses extensions. Ce modèle dérive une fonc-tion comportemental d’arrimage sur le marche ́ du mariage. Le modèle d’allocation intra-ménage des tâches peut s’intégrer a ̀ ce cadre d’analyse. Les offres de travail des époux répondent aux conditions changeantes du marche ́ du mariage. Un marche ́ du mariage serré, un ratio d’hommes célibataires de type i par rapport a ̀ un nombre de femmes célibataires de type j constitue une statistique suffisante pour établir les conditions de 2008 Canadian Economic Association presidential address. I would like to thank all m