We consider a media market where consumers mix content of-fered by different firms and firms charge two-part tariffs. As com-pared to pure linear pricing (pay-per-view), firms make higher profits, while consumers are worse off and the allocation is not first-best. We also consider flat subscription fees and show that they make mixing unattractive. Both two-part tariffs and pay-per-view Pareto-dominate flat fees
This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to m...
Media platforms face the choice between lump-sum and proportional fees when they charge advertisers....
We look at the competition and the welfare effects of bundling in the context of vertically differen...
We consider a market where consumers mix goods offered by two firms differentiated a la Hotelling, a...
We consider a market where consumers mix goods offered by two firms differentiated a la Hotelling, a...
This paper discusses the pricing- and welfare implications of mergers in two-sided media markets. Me...
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee p...
Two media platforms compete for heterogeneous users bothered by commercials and sell advertising spa...
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee p...
We model a duopoly in which media compete in both the con-sumer and the advertising markets. The adv...
This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to m...
This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media mar-kets when viewers can subscribe to ...
A TV platform provides content to viewers and viewers to advertising producers. We study platform pr...
This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media mar-kets when viewers can subscribe to ...
This chapter focuses on the economic mechanisms at work in recent models of advertising finance in m...
This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to m...
Media platforms face the choice between lump-sum and proportional fees when they charge advertisers....
We look at the competition and the welfare effects of bundling in the context of vertically differen...
We consider a market where consumers mix goods offered by two firms differentiated a la Hotelling, a...
We consider a market where consumers mix goods offered by two firms differentiated a la Hotelling, a...
This paper discusses the pricing- and welfare implications of mergers in two-sided media markets. Me...
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee p...
Two media platforms compete for heterogeneous users bothered by commercials and sell advertising spa...
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee p...
We model a duopoly in which media compete in both the con-sumer and the advertising markets. The adv...
This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to m...
This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media mar-kets when viewers can subscribe to ...
A TV platform provides content to viewers and viewers to advertising producers. We study platform pr...
This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media mar-kets when viewers can subscribe to ...
This chapter focuses on the economic mechanisms at work in recent models of advertising finance in m...
This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to m...
Media platforms face the choice between lump-sum and proportional fees when they charge advertisers....
We look at the competition and the welfare effects of bundling in the context of vertically differen...