In a decentralized market traders are matched into pairs and sellers make price offers. Traders have a finite life expectancy, exiting the market with a constant hazard rate . With vanishing it is shown that an equi-librium exists and that the market converges to the efficient competitive outcome. Additional assumptions that can be found in the literature and that are favorable to the efficient outcome are not needed
Understanding how risk and risk preferences affect the institutions of trade are questions of substa...
Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon in which both buyers and sellers h...
In markets with adverse selection, only low-quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when ...
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. Bargaining in such markets occurs in the con...
In this paper, we study out-of-equilibrium dynamics with decentralized exchange (bilateral bargainin...
This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are m...
In markets with adverse selection, when average quality is low and frictions are small decentralized...
In this paper, we study out-of-equilibrium dynamics with decentralised exchange (bilateral bargainin...
Is the result that equilibrium trading outcomes are efficient in markets without frictions robust to...
Is the result that equilibrium trading outcomes are efficient in markets without frictions robust to...
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentra...
We analyze a dynamic, decentralized market with endogenous entry, where in each period the active se...
The paper analyzes quantity competition in economies in which a network describes the set of feasibl...
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentra...
This article considers equilibrium decentralized trade when there is a marketplace where buyers and ...
Understanding how risk and risk preferences affect the institutions of trade are questions of substa...
Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon in which both buyers and sellers h...
In markets with adverse selection, only low-quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when ...
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. Bargaining in such markets occurs in the con...
In this paper, we study out-of-equilibrium dynamics with decentralized exchange (bilateral bargainin...
This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are m...
In markets with adverse selection, when average quality is low and frictions are small decentralized...
In this paper, we study out-of-equilibrium dynamics with decentralised exchange (bilateral bargainin...
Is the result that equilibrium trading outcomes are efficient in markets without frictions robust to...
Is the result that equilibrium trading outcomes are efficient in markets without frictions robust to...
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentra...
We analyze a dynamic, decentralized market with endogenous entry, where in each period the active se...
The paper analyzes quantity competition in economies in which a network describes the set of feasibl...
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentra...
This article considers equilibrium decentralized trade when there is a marketplace where buyers and ...
Understanding how risk and risk preferences affect the institutions of trade are questions of substa...
Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon in which both buyers and sellers h...
In markets with adverse selection, only low-quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when ...