Do nuclear weapons reduce the probability of war? This paper quantitatively evaluates the nuclear peace hypothesis. The results indicate that the impact of nuclear weapons is more complicated than is conventionally appreciated. Both proliferation optimists and pessimists find confirmation of some of their key claims. When a nuclear asymmetry exists between two states, there is a greater chance of militarized disputes and war. In contrast, when there is symmetry and both states possess nuclear weapons, then the odds of war precipitously drop. When combined, these findings provide support for the existence of the stability-instability paradox. Evidence suggests that while nuclear weapons promote strategic stability, they simultaneously allow ...
This article contributes to both the theoretical elaboration and empirical testing of the ‘stability...
Existing nuclear deterrence scholarship evinces a pervasive ‘‘existential bias,’’ assuming that once...
We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if th...
Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations abou...
The claim that the spread of nuclear weapons leads to interstate conflict and nuclear war has become...
What is the effect of developing nuclear weapons on a state’s conflict propensity? Extant answers to...
We examine the effect of nuclear weapons on interstate conflict. Using more appropriate methodologie...
An open question in nuclear deterrence theory is whether and how the balance of military power affec...
Nuclear weapons ’ effects on an actor’s success in coercive diplomacy are in part a function of how ...
Nuclear weapons ’ effects on an actor’s success in coercive diplomacy are in part a function of how ...
The effect of nuclear weapons has long been debated. Some argue that these weapons have a stabilizin...
Scholars have long recognized that imminent shifts in relative power may motivate declining states t...
I employ a human subject experiment to assess the relationship between nuclear proliferation and war...
The spread of nuclear weapons is a hotly debated topic, with two dominating schools of thought. One ...
We develop a formal model of bargaining between two states where one can invest in a program to deve...
This article contributes to both the theoretical elaboration and empirical testing of the ‘stability...
Existing nuclear deterrence scholarship evinces a pervasive ‘‘existential bias,’’ assuming that once...
We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if th...
Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations abou...
The claim that the spread of nuclear weapons leads to interstate conflict and nuclear war has become...
What is the effect of developing nuclear weapons on a state’s conflict propensity? Extant answers to...
We examine the effect of nuclear weapons on interstate conflict. Using more appropriate methodologie...
An open question in nuclear deterrence theory is whether and how the balance of military power affec...
Nuclear weapons ’ effects on an actor’s success in coercive diplomacy are in part a function of how ...
Nuclear weapons ’ effects on an actor’s success in coercive diplomacy are in part a function of how ...
The effect of nuclear weapons has long been debated. Some argue that these weapons have a stabilizin...
Scholars have long recognized that imminent shifts in relative power may motivate declining states t...
I employ a human subject experiment to assess the relationship between nuclear proliferation and war...
The spread of nuclear weapons is a hotly debated topic, with two dominating schools of thought. One ...
We develop a formal model of bargaining between two states where one can invest in a program to deve...
This article contributes to both the theoretical elaboration and empirical testing of the ‘stability...
Existing nuclear deterrence scholarship evinces a pervasive ‘‘existential bias,’’ assuming that once...
We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if th...