ON SCIENTIFIC METHOD AS A METHOD FOR TESTING THE LEGITIMACY OF CONCEPTS

ABSTRACT. Traditional attempts to delineate the distinctive rationality of modern science have taken it for granted that the purpose of empirical research is to test judgments. The choice of concepts to use in those judgments is therefore seen either a matter of indifference (Popper) or as important choice which must be made, so to speak, in advance of all empirical research (Carnap). I argue that scientific method aims precisely at empirical testing of concepts, and that even the simplest scientific ex-periment or observation results in conceptual change. There are two classic approaches, within analytic philosophy, to explaining the distinctive rationality of modern science. One of these—due, in its most influential form, to Rudolf Carnap—begins with the idea that science deals in legitimate concepts (or, as Carnap preferred to put things, uses meaningful terms). The other, due to Karl Popper, is that science follows a method suitable for seeking objective knowledge: a method, namely, in which one’s position i