Animal Cognition

Debates in applied ethics about the proper treatment of animals (see ANIMAL RIGHTS; ANIMALS, MORAL STATUS OF) often refer to empirical data about animal cognition, emotion (see EMOTION), and behavior. In addition, there is increasing interest in the question of whether any nonhuman animal could be something like a moral agent (see MORAL AGENCY). These two questions are related but do not entirely overlap. If animals are moral agents we presumably need to grant them moral standing (see MORAL STATUS). If animals are not moral agents, there may be independent reasons for considering their interests. Empirical findings are relevant to both questions. This entry is designed to guide ethicists to the relevant data and claims of scientists and philosophers about capacities related to animal ethics. Moral standing In ethics, the usual question about animals has to do with whether nonhuman species are justified objects of sympathy and moral concern. In applied ethics, there are related questions about vegetarianism (see VEGETARIANISM AND VEGANISM), medical testing (see ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION), testing of consumer products, hunting (see HUNTING), catch-and-release fishing, zoos, husbandry, living conditions, ecotourism, entertainment, and so forth. Some of these arguments rest on claims about the worth of the species (see SPECIES, THE VALUE OF) or focus on the instrumental value (see INSTRUMENTAL VALUE) of treating animals well. Other arguments are based on the cognitive capacities of individual animals, such as the capacity of an animal to experience pain and suffering (see SENTIENCE, MORAL RELEVANCE OF), or to think about the future. Questions about the proper treatment of research and zoo animals might also be addressed by considering the quality of social relationships among such animals. Other cognitive capacities, such as rationality and personhood (see PERSONHOOD, CRITERIA OF), are also sometimes thought necessary for moral agency