In democratic societies with skewed income distributions, simple political economy models predict that the poor will form a coalition to implement high taxes. I review this basic theory and some of its extensions. Then I discuss how we can test the model, and some common pitfalls, before I review the empirical findings. Generally, the empirical support for the theory is weak. I end with a review of selected parts of the literature that tries to explain this lack of empirical support
Abstract. This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reason-able assumptions, the ...
Theories of political redistribution are tested using data collected in three phases of the Internat...
Against the current consensus among comparative political economists, we argue that inequality matte...
This paper proposes an explanation for why universal suffrage has not implied larger rich-to-poor tr...
I begin with an economic environment familiar from welfare- and political-economic literatures and s...
Why are governments elected by proportional representation more prone to redistribute income than th...
We test a key assumption underlying seminal theories about preferences for redistribution, which is ...
In many democracies- despite the fact that poor voters constitute a majority- greater income inequal...
Some scholars champion broad conceptualizations of democracy where distribution of economic resource...
This dissertation focuses on the political responses to income inequality. Multiple critical puzzles...
The classic democratic theory of redistribution claims that an increase in market income inequality ...
We develop a general model of redistribution and use it to account for the remarkable variance in go...
Summary. We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the ini...
Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981),fail...
Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981),fail...
Abstract. This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reason-able assumptions, the ...
Theories of political redistribution are tested using data collected in three phases of the Internat...
Against the current consensus among comparative political economists, we argue that inequality matte...
This paper proposes an explanation for why universal suffrage has not implied larger rich-to-poor tr...
I begin with an economic environment familiar from welfare- and political-economic literatures and s...
Why are governments elected by proportional representation more prone to redistribute income than th...
We test a key assumption underlying seminal theories about preferences for redistribution, which is ...
In many democracies- despite the fact that poor voters constitute a majority- greater income inequal...
Some scholars champion broad conceptualizations of democracy where distribution of economic resource...
This dissertation focuses on the political responses to income inequality. Multiple critical puzzles...
The classic democratic theory of redistribution claims that an increase in market income inequality ...
We develop a general model of redistribution and use it to account for the remarkable variance in go...
Summary. We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the ini...
Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981),fail...
Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981),fail...
Abstract. This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reason-able assumptions, the ...
Theories of political redistribution are tested using data collected in three phases of the Internat...
Against the current consensus among comparative political economists, we argue that inequality matte...