Add to ORKGDoes consciousness require a self?1 In what follows, I argue that it does not. I concede at the outset that this is a counterintuitive thesis. For, a central feature of conscious states is that their mode of appearance (i.e. how they are given) exhibits an irreducibly first-personal nature. My experiences ar
The notion of consciousness, though central to contemporary philosophy of mind, is not well understo...
Strong subjective factors embedded in self-existence and the non-reductive and encompassed existence...
Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to havin...
It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., w...
Is self-consciousness necessary for consciousness? The answer is yes. So there you have it—the answe...
Abstract: Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to g...
Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfho...
Self-evidencing describes the purported predictive processing of all self-organising systems, whethe...
Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. Accordi...
When you enjoy a conscious mental state or episode, you can knowledgeably self-ascribe that state or...
Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. Accordi...
This thesis investigates the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness. I consider t...
Can there be phenomenal consciousness without self-consciousness? Strong intuitions and prominent th...
Abstract: Higher-order theories and neo-Brentanian theories of consciousness both consider conscious...
James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. Thi...
The notion of consciousness, though central to contemporary philosophy of mind, is not well understo...
Strong subjective factors embedded in self-existence and the non-reductive and encompassed existence...
Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to havin...
It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., w...
Is self-consciousness necessary for consciousness? The answer is yes. So there you have it—the answe...
Abstract: Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to g...
Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfho...
Self-evidencing describes the purported predictive processing of all self-organising systems, whethe...
Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. Accordi...
When you enjoy a conscious mental state or episode, you can knowledgeably self-ascribe that state or...
Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. Accordi...
This thesis investigates the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness. I consider t...
Can there be phenomenal consciousness without self-consciousness? Strong intuitions and prominent th...
Abstract: Higher-order theories and neo-Brentanian theories of consciousness both consider conscious...
James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. Thi...
The notion of consciousness, though central to contemporary philosophy of mind, is not well understo...
Strong subjective factors embedded in self-existence and the non-reductive and encompassed existence...
Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to havin...