Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First

ABSTRACT Perceptions and efforts to signal resolve can play an important role in counterinsurgency. The Coalition offensive against Fallujah in April 2004 demonstrates the limitations of relying on military force to signal resolve. The offensive catalyzed insurgent violence in Iraq and generated popular support for the insurgency. The Coalition prematurely halted the offensive because the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) could not maintain support for the Coalition in the face of popular outrage. Given the importance of democratizing Iraq and establishing a sovereign government, the objections of the IGC could not be ignored. Without Iraqi political support, military force ultimately signaled weak-ness instead of resolve. KEY WORDS: counterinsurgency, Fallujah, Iraq Perceptions matter in a guerrilla war, as in all conflict. Members of the population may join an insurgency because they perceive the government or occupying power as uncommitted to enduring the costs of counterinsurgency, or they may abandon the insurgency because they perceive insurgent violence as pointless in the face of a determined government or occupying power. Accordingly, signaling resolve – taking actions that indicate that the government or occupying power will bear the costs of suppressing the insurgency – plays a critical role in convincing potential insurgents of the futility of violence. Military force often seems the obvious means to signal resolve. Besides clearing a safe haven or killing a key leader, an offensive or raid can compel the population to recalculate whether they can endure the costs of violence and outlast the governing power. The First Battle of Fallujah in April 2004 renders a cautionary lesson on using military force to signal resolve in an unconventional conflict. The United States launched the offensive into Fallujah in order to signa