On What Makes Certain Dynamical Systems Cognitive: A Minimally Cognitive Organization

Dynamicism has provided cognitive science with important tools to understand some aspects of “how cognitive agents work ” but the issue of “what makes something cognitive ” has not been sufficiently addressed yet and, we argue, the former will never be complete without the latter. Behavioristic char-acterizations of cognitive properties are criticized in favor of an organizational approach focused on the internal dynamic relationships that constitute cognitive systems. A definition of cognition as adap-tive-autonomy in the embodied and situated neurodynamic domain is provided: the compensatory regulation of a web of stability dependencies between sensorimotor structures is created and pre-served during a historical/developmental process. We highlight the functional role of emotional embodiment: internal bioregulatory processes coupled to the formation and adaptive regulation of neurodynamic autonomy. Finally, we discuss a “minimally cognitive behavior program ” in evolutionary simulation modeling suggesting that much is to be learned from a complementary “minimally cognitive organization program”. Keywords minimal cognition · adaptive autonomy · neurodynamic organization · cognition-as-it-could-be · emotional embodiment