The Aect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits

This paper re-examines the commonly observed inverse relationship between per-ceived risk and perceived benefit. We propose that this relationship occurs because people rely on aect when judging the risk and benefit of specific hazards. Evidence supporting this proposal is obtained in two experimental studies. Study 1 investigated the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments under a time-pressure condition designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance on aect. As expected, the inverse relationship was strengthened when time pressure was introduced. Study 2 tested and confirmed the hypothesis that providing information designed to alter the favorability of one’s overall aective evaluation of an item (say nuclear power) would systematically change the risk and benefit judgments for that item. Both studies suggest that people seem prone to using an ‘aect heuristic ’ which improves judgmental eciency by deriving both risk and benefit evaluations from a common source — aective reactions to the stimulus item. Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd