Succession rules and leadership rents

Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules a¤ect the power of leaders relative to support-ers as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regime and the divide-et-impera regime which di¤er with respect to the role of supporters of the previous leader once the new leader takes power. The leadership rent is higher and supporters receive a lower compensation in the divide-et-impera regime, as supporters have to \u85ght harder for succession to avoid the grim outcome of loss. Leaders, then, would like to induce the divide-et-impera regime even when every supporter has veto power over his leadership. Konrad gratefully acknowledges \u85nancial support by the German Science Foundation (DFG grant SFB-TR 15). We thank Florian Engelmaier, Vimal Kumar, Dan Kovenock