Add to ORKGIn this paper, we examine the behavior of the agent who envies his principal’s wealth, and characterize the properties of the optimal incentive scheme under adverse selection. Under restrictive envy conditions, contracting structures often differ from those predicted by standard solutions of canonical adverse selection problem
This article is devoted to adverse selection problems in which individual private information is a w...
In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse sele...
We are studying in this paper an interplay between workers in organizations under the assumption tha...
In this paper, we introduce that the principal and the agent can contract at the ex ante stage, and ...
We explore in this paper the consequences of status seeking preferences among agents contracting wit...
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his empl...
We examine an adverse selection relationship in which the principal is unaware of the ex ante distri...
In practice, incentive schemes are rarely tailored to the specific characteristics of contracting pa...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assu...
Due to information asymmetry, adverse selection exists largely in the multiagent market. Aiming at t...
This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent w...
Abstract. In the paper we analyze a contractual relationship between two economic agents using a sta...
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often...
The paper analyzes an ex-ante contracting with limited liability constraints when agents feel enviou...
This article is devoted to adverse selection problems in which individual private information is a w...
In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse sele...
We are studying in this paper an interplay between workers in organizations under the assumption tha...
In this paper, we introduce that the principal and the agent can contract at the ex ante stage, and ...
We explore in this paper the consequences of status seeking preferences among agents contracting wit...
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his empl...
We examine an adverse selection relationship in which the principal is unaware of the ex ante distri...
In practice, incentive schemes are rarely tailored to the specific characteristics of contracting pa...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assu...
Due to information asymmetry, adverse selection exists largely in the multiagent market. Aiming at t...
This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent w...
Abstract. In the paper we analyze a contractual relationship between two economic agents using a sta...
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often...
The paper analyzes an ex-ante contracting with limited liability constraints when agents feel enviou...
This article is devoted to adverse selection problems in which individual private information is a w...
In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse sele...
We are studying in this paper an interplay between workers in organizations under the assumption tha...