McCarl's comment to our 1986 article provides an opportunity to correct what has evidently proven to be an exercise in miscommunication. We wish to use this opportunity to address McCarl's stated concerns and to clarify our original message. McCarl claims that our statement, "the magni-tude of the risk aversion coefficient is unaffected by the use of incremental rather than absolute re-turns..., " is equivalent to r(x + c) = r(x), where x is an incremental return and c is the previous wealth level. Such an interpretation of our statement would ignore the distinction between the utility of wealth and the utility of incremental (or annual) returns. We did not mean to imply that wealth is an irrel-evant factor in utility d...
In the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the e...
An increase in risk aversion, defined by a concavification of the utility function, does not always ...
A recent contribution by Meyer et al. (2009, p. 521) corrected an error of fact by Hardaker et al. (...
ful paper dealing with several items relating to the Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coefficient (RAC). On...
The Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion, as defined by r(x) =-u"(x)/u'(x), is w...
The Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion, as defined by r(x} = u"{x}/u' (x}, is well known ...
The Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion, as defined by r(x)=-un(x)/u1(x), is well known to...
Arrow (1971) shows that an expected-utility maximizer with a differentiable utility function will al...
While there is no abstract for this paper, it makes an argument that relative risk aversion is decre...
There is a sizable literature reporting the conclusion that expected utility theory cannot provide a...
There is a large literature estimating Arrow-Pratt coefficients of absolute and relative risk avers...
textabstractEmpirically, co-skewness of asset returns seems to explain a substantial part of the cro...
Within the expected-utility framework, the only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility f...
Contrary to popular belief, risk aversion is not always equivalent to concavity of the "utility of i...
Bardsley and Harris (1987) test empirically the effects of changes In deterministic wealth and rando...
In the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the e...
An increase in risk aversion, defined by a concavification of the utility function, does not always ...
A recent contribution by Meyer et al. (2009, p. 521) corrected an error of fact by Hardaker et al. (...
ful paper dealing with several items relating to the Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coefficient (RAC). On...
The Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion, as defined by r(x) =-u"(x)/u'(x), is w...
The Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion, as defined by r(x} = u"{x}/u' (x}, is well known ...
The Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion, as defined by r(x)=-un(x)/u1(x), is well known to...
Arrow (1971) shows that an expected-utility maximizer with a differentiable utility function will al...
While there is no abstract for this paper, it makes an argument that relative risk aversion is decre...
There is a sizable literature reporting the conclusion that expected utility theory cannot provide a...
There is a large literature estimating Arrow-Pratt coefficients of absolute and relative risk avers...
textabstractEmpirically, co-skewness of asset returns seems to explain a substantial part of the cro...
Within the expected-utility framework, the only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility f...
Contrary to popular belief, risk aversion is not always equivalent to concavity of the "utility of i...
Bardsley and Harris (1987) test empirically the effects of changes In deterministic wealth and rando...
In the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the e...
An increase in risk aversion, defined by a concavification of the utility function, does not always ...
A recent contribution by Meyer et al. (2009, p. 521) corrected an error of fact by Hardaker et al. (...