Learning to learn is a basic foundation of life and necessary for evolution. The ability to show the existence of learning can at times be difficult in one-shot, non-cooperative games. The ability to transfer knowledge from one situation to another is an indication of how much one actually learns and how it is applied. The purpose of this paper is to show the existence of learning in this type of game by using the vertical checkers game “Connect 4”. By looking at the difference in won-loss records between two tournaments and the distribution of the scores, we can show that learning has occurred when teams have a greater degree of parity and that average number of wins increases as the range of wins decreases
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. ...
In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We st...
Learning to learn is a basic foundation of life and necessary for evolution. The ability to show the...
This paper explores the extent to which people learn in repeated games without feedback, and the ext...
This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about ...
This paper presents a new, probabilistic model of learning in games. The model is set in the usual r...
We study behavior in repeated interactions when agents have no information about the structure of th...
The present study would like to show - among other things - in the spirit of Hyndman, Terracol and V...
AbstractWe study behavior in repeated interactions when agents have no information about the structu...
This paper studies the learning process carried out by two agents who are involved in many games. As...
We study models of learning in games where agents with limited memory use social information to deci...
While the Nash equilibrium is the best established and understood solution concept for noncooperativ...
Psychologists have long recognized two kinds of learning: one that is relatively shallow and domain-...
This paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of lea...
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. ...
In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We st...
Learning to learn is a basic foundation of life and necessary for evolution. The ability to show the...
This paper explores the extent to which people learn in repeated games without feedback, and the ext...
This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about ...
This paper presents a new, probabilistic model of learning in games. The model is set in the usual r...
We study behavior in repeated interactions when agents have no information about the structure of th...
The present study would like to show - among other things - in the spirit of Hyndman, Terracol and V...
AbstractWe study behavior in repeated interactions when agents have no information about the structu...
This paper studies the learning process carried out by two agents who are involved in many games. As...
We study models of learning in games where agents with limited memory use social information to deci...
While the Nash equilibrium is the best established and understood solution concept for noncooperativ...
Psychologists have long recognized two kinds of learning: one that is relatively shallow and domain-...
This paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of lea...
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. ...
In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We st...