We introduce the mixed quantal response equilibrium as an alternative statistical approach to normal form games with random utility function and prove its existence. Then we extend the quantal response equilibrium to payoff functions with disturbances outside the family of admissible distributions. Finally, we define the mixed logit quantal response equilibrium, we draw the correspondence between it and the multinomial mixed logit model and prove that any random utility game has a quantal response equilibrium, which additionally is the limit of a parametric mixed logit quantal response equilibrium
The effect of adding noise to both an equilibrium model and a naive Bayesian model of behavior in st...
Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition...
We present a general existence result for a type of equilibrium in normal-form games. We consider no...
We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting...
This paper describes a statistical model of equiliobrium behaviour in games, which we call Quantal R...
This article investigates the use of standard econometric models for quantal choice to study equilib...
The structural Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) generalizes the Nash equilibrium by augmenting pay...
This paper applies quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models (McKelvey and Palfrey, Games and Econom...
The Nash Bargaining problem in the context of a random utility model yields a stochastic demand for ...
The Logit version of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) predicts that equilibrium behavior in games ...
We develop an equilibrium concept coined Endogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (EQRE) based on he...
This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturba...
A quantal response specifies choice probabilities that are smooth, increasing functions of expected ...
The present paper fully characterizes equilibria of the generalized volunteer’s dilemma game, which ...
The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) notion of Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995) ha...
The effect of adding noise to both an equilibrium model and a naive Bayesian model of behavior in st...
Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition...
We present a general existence result for a type of equilibrium in normal-form games. We consider no...
We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting...
This paper describes a statistical model of equiliobrium behaviour in games, which we call Quantal R...
This article investigates the use of standard econometric models for quantal choice to study equilib...
The structural Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) generalizes the Nash equilibrium by augmenting pay...
This paper applies quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models (McKelvey and Palfrey, Games and Econom...
The Nash Bargaining problem in the context of a random utility model yields a stochastic demand for ...
The Logit version of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) predicts that equilibrium behavior in games ...
We develop an equilibrium concept coined Endogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (EQRE) based on he...
This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturba...
A quantal response specifies choice probabilities that are smooth, increasing functions of expected ...
The present paper fully characterizes equilibria of the generalized volunteer’s dilemma game, which ...
The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) notion of Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995) ha...
The effect of adding noise to both an equilibrium model and a naive Bayesian model of behavior in st...
Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition...
We present a general existence result for a type of equilibrium in normal-form games. We consider no...