Sequential First-Price Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands

We study a sequence of two-round, \u85 rst-price, sealed bid auctions within the independent private values paradigm. We assume that all bidders want to purchase both items and the bidders valuation for the object remains the same in both rounds. After the conclusion of the \u85rst round, the winner and the winning bid are publicly announced. The bidders use this information to update their beliefs about the valuations of their opponent. We characterize the equilibrium and nd that compared to the standard results of one-shot \u85rst-price auction, the bidders bid lower in the \u85rst-round of our model. We also show that the rst-round loser bids more aggressively in the second-round than the \u85rst-round winner. Lastly, we present that the two-round \u85rst-price auction generates less revenue for the auctioneer than the two-round second-price auction