Political responsiveness and credibility in regulatory administration." Pp

Regulatory administration in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden has gone through frequent and dramatic changes since 1950. Reforms are neither restricted to economic regulation, nor to the post-1980-reform period. The changes facilitate political control through either the parliamentary chain of delegation or collegiate boards, often with strong corporatist traits. However, the changes do not follow a universal pattern. Rather they build on organisational forms that are embedded in national administrative traditions. The analysis questions the validity of functionalist theories of regulatory reform while finding support for structural choice theory. In parliamentary systems of the European type policy makers prefer organisational designs that maximise flexibility with regard to delegating to independent regulators, but remain within the confines of national administrative tradition. Here Swedish central government is of particular interest due to the dualist principles inscribed into the constitution that guide it. They represent a strong form of credible commitment through agency independence. However, the analysis shows how policy makers over time have gradually eroded this independence.