Add to ORKGI am grateful to an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions. Thanks are also due to P.G.Babu, Kaushik Basu and Dilip Mookherjee. This is a revised version of an earlier paper “Hierarchies
We reconsider Tirole's framework of a three-tier principal-agent problem, in which he has shown that...
The purpose of this article is to broadly characterize the political economy or institutionalist the...
I study a class of agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an underlying organiza...
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible enforcers in an agency framework. We ex...
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible supervisor in an agency framework. We e...
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible enforcers in a principal-supervisor-age...
We study the problem of organizing three agents in a hierarchical monitoring structure and designing...
Recent empirical analysis has shown the strong correlation between indexes of corruption and ineffec...
This dissertation consists of three essays in microeconomics and organization theory. These essays a...
We consider a model of enforcement where the Principal relies on the Supervisor for information on t...
This Ph.D. thesis is a collection of four papers, each one corresponding to a chapter. The backgroun...
We apply the Monotone Comparative Statics method and the First Order (Mirrlees) Approach to the cont...
This paper considers a variation of the partnership game with imperfect public information, in which...
This thesis consists of three independent essays which contribute to the literatures on organization...
Structural theories of collusion posit that demand and supply characteristics of an industry\u27s st...
We reconsider Tirole's framework of a three-tier principal-agent problem, in which he has shown that...
The purpose of this article is to broadly characterize the political economy or institutionalist the...
I study a class of agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an underlying organiza...
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible enforcers in an agency framework. We ex...
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible supervisor in an agency framework. We e...
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible enforcers in a principal-supervisor-age...
We study the problem of organizing three agents in a hierarchical monitoring structure and designing...
Recent empirical analysis has shown the strong correlation between indexes of corruption and ineffec...
This dissertation consists of three essays in microeconomics and organization theory. These essays a...
We consider a model of enforcement where the Principal relies on the Supervisor for information on t...
This Ph.D. thesis is a collection of four papers, each one corresponding to a chapter. The backgroun...
We apply the Monotone Comparative Statics method and the First Order (Mirrlees) Approach to the cont...
This paper considers a variation of the partnership game with imperfect public information, in which...
This thesis consists of three independent essays which contribute to the literatures on organization...
Structural theories of collusion posit that demand and supply characteristics of an industry\u27s st...
We reconsider Tirole's framework of a three-tier principal-agent problem, in which he has shown that...
The purpose of this article is to broadly characterize the political economy or institutionalist the...
I study a class of agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an underlying organiza...