permission On the Track of the Good Life An Objectivist, Reductionist Account of What We Ought to Do1

In the Apology, Socrates notes that the goals of many of his fellow Athenians are mistaken: rather than pursuing “as much wealth, reputation, and honors as possible, ” they ought instead to pursue wisdom and virtue (Ap. 29d-30b). In the Crito, Socrates claims that considerations of justice override any competing considerations, and that his views about the priority of justice apply not only to people like him who have a deep commitment to justice, but to everyone, including, presumably, those who do not happen to share his ends (Cr. 48c-49a). But what is the basis for Socrates ’ views that his fellow Athenians ’ ends are mistaken? If Socrates ’ fellow Athenians do not care about wisdom and virtue, and if wisdom and virtue are not necessary for anything they do care about, then why should they pursue wisdom and virtue? These are ancient philosophical questions, and the likelihood for consensus on an answer to them seems remote. Currently, most philosophers who seek to answer such questions offer answers that are of one of two sorts: (1) subjectivist reductionist, according to which fundamental normative claims about what S ought to do, or what sort of person S ought to be, are true in virtue of facts about the S’s (or the speaker’s) ultimate commitments or values, or (2) objectivist non-reductionist, according to which such claims are made true by th