Conflict Linkages: Democratic Institutions and Their Effect on Ethnic Political Violence

The phenomenon of political violence committed by the citizens against the state is the source of much debate and contention. Explanations of political violence by minority and ethnic groups in a country cover a wide range of factors, from socioeconomic disparity to cultural and political discrimination. The question remains as to how one might reduce the motivation to resort to violence. The use of democratic institutions has been suggested as one way in which states reduce their amount of violence. This presents the question of the role of political institutions on the level and nature of political violence. Simply put, does the kind of institutional framework matter in determining incentives for political violence committed by ethnic groups when other possible causes are controlled? In this paper I will evaluate the link between ethnically charged political violence and the institutional makeup of a country over time. I argue that the extant literature is too rigid in its conclusions. The literature argues that either certain institutions or set of institutions is better at combating ethnic violence, while I contend that a more nuanced approach to ethnic political violence needs to be taken by policy makers. This paper concludes that a definitive set of institutions fails to account for nature of inter-institutional relations and how numerous institutional frameworks can alleviate ethnic political violence