Small Group Dynamics and Foreign Policymaking: Evidence from Iterated Prisoners Dilemma Game Experiments. Typescript

Because important foreign policy decisions are usually crafted by small groups of policymakers, it is important to examine the effects of group dynamics and features of groups on the choices those groups make. The effects of two group features, the extent to which groups experience internal conflict or controversy about what choices to make and the decision rules adopted by a group to reach a group decision, on the decisions those groups make are examined in the context of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Results suggests that groups of experimental subjects that experience conflict or controversy within the group about what decision to make are significantly more likely to make competitive (non-cooperative) choices in the Prisoners Dilemma context, though the effects are conditional based upon the prior decision outcome. The analysis also suggests that there is no systematic relationship between the decision rules that groups use to resolve within group conflict and the choices those groups make.