Unsolicited rating agencies convey information about potential borrowers to investors whether or not the borrowers want it to do so. However, as they do this without the consent of the borrowers, they are not paid for this service by the borrowers. It is often argued that this is done to build reputation. In this paper, we develop a model that identifies the scenarios where unsolicited ratings can co exist profitably with solicited ratings
Would the credit ratings of unsolicited banks be higher if they were solicited? Alternatively, would...
This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incen-tives to reveal ...
Why did rating agencies do such a bad job rating subprime securities? The conventional answer draws ...
This paper analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the actual outcome of bank ratings. Using t...
Unsolicited ratings have long been overlooked in the investment landscape and issuer pay models. Alt...
This paper develops a dynamic rational expectations model of the credit rating process, incorporatin...
This paper examines why, for non-U.S. firms, unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited rat...
This paper aims at contributing to the debate on whether unsolicited ratings are strategically motiv...
This paper studies the incentives of rating agencies to reveal the information that they obtain abou...
This paper examines the potential for conflicts of interest in the debt ratings business. Inherent i...
This paper studies firms' financial reporting incentives in the presence of strategic credit rating ...
This paper examines the potential for conflicts of interest in the debt ratings business. Inherent i...
Credit rating agencies(CRAs) are accused of failing to provide accurate and fair credit ratings and ...
I examine whether rating agencies strategically manipulate the informativeness of bond ratings in re...
There has been considerable controversy over unsolicited credit ratings in recent years. Some dissat...
Would the credit ratings of unsolicited banks be higher if they were solicited? Alternatively, would...
This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incen-tives to reveal ...
Why did rating agencies do such a bad job rating subprime securities? The conventional answer draws ...
This paper analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the actual outcome of bank ratings. Using t...
Unsolicited ratings have long been overlooked in the investment landscape and issuer pay models. Alt...
This paper develops a dynamic rational expectations model of the credit rating process, incorporatin...
This paper examines why, for non-U.S. firms, unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited rat...
This paper aims at contributing to the debate on whether unsolicited ratings are strategically motiv...
This paper studies the incentives of rating agencies to reveal the information that they obtain abou...
This paper examines the potential for conflicts of interest in the debt ratings business. Inherent i...
This paper studies firms' financial reporting incentives in the presence of strategic credit rating ...
This paper examines the potential for conflicts of interest in the debt ratings business. Inherent i...
Credit rating agencies(CRAs) are accused of failing to provide accurate and fair credit ratings and ...
I examine whether rating agencies strategically manipulate the informativeness of bond ratings in re...
There has been considerable controversy over unsolicited credit ratings in recent years. Some dissat...
Would the credit ratings of unsolicited banks be higher if they were solicited? Alternatively, would...
This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incen-tives to reveal ...
Why did rating agencies do such a bad job rating subprime securities? The conventional answer draws ...