Add to ORKGAbstract: In an international trading economy where countries behave strategically, this paper provides sufficient conditions under which all coun-tries choose to trade on one ‘world ’ market. The paper shows that the eco-nomic structure underlying a standard strategic trade model corresponds to a Shapley-Shubik market game. Using new results from monotone comparative statics in a Shapley-Shubik market game, replication of such an international trading economy is studied. Sufficient conditions are established under which all countries in the replica economy would choose to trade with the countries in the original economy
Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976],...
This paper analyses the international trade dynamics between two countries as a two-player, non-zero...
We study the strategic interaction between two firms competing in quan-tites which decide whether ex...
Abstract: In an international trading economy where countries set tariffs strategically, modeled usi...
In an international trading economy where countries set tariffs strategically, modeled using a Cobb-...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
A series of models are developed in which international trade is modelled as a two-stage game betwee...
The paper analyses the basic strategies of the international trade of two countries, analogous to th...
Cooperative game theory has been frequently used to model various economic problems. As is well-know...
This paper constitutes the very first treatment of the Shapley–Shubik (1977) market-game mechanism w...
Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976],...
This paper analyses the international trade dynamics between two countries as a two-player, non-zero...
We study the strategic interaction between two firms competing in quan-tites which decide whether ex...
Abstract: In an international trading economy where countries set tariffs strategically, modeled usi...
In an international trading economy where countries set tariffs strategically, modeled using a Cobb-...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
International audienceThis paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one...
A series of models are developed in which international trade is modelled as a two-stage game betwee...
The paper analyses the basic strategies of the international trade of two countries, analogous to th...
Cooperative game theory has been frequently used to model various economic problems. As is well-know...
This paper constitutes the very first treatment of the Shapley–Shubik (1977) market-game mechanism w...
Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976],...
This paper analyses the international trade dynamics between two countries as a two-player, non-zero...
We study the strategic interaction between two firms competing in quan-tites which decide whether ex...