Abstract. We prove—in the standard independent private-values model—that the outcome, in terms of expected probabilities of trade and expected transfers, of any Bayesian mechanism, can also be obtained with a dominant strategy mechanism
We extend the principal/one-agent model with countervailing incentives to a framework in which the p...
Classical Bayesian mechanism design is “centralized”, that is, the designer is assumed to know the d...
When environments are 'rich', single-valued social choice functions which are implementabl...
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensio...
We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private inf...
© 2013 The Econometric Society. We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utiliti...
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensio...
We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gersh...
We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent'...
We introduce a perfect price discriminating mechanism for allocation problems with private informati...
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensio...
We study the equivalence between Bayes-Nash Incentive Compat-ibility (BIC) and Dominant Strategy Inc...
In private-value auction environments, Chung and Ely (2007) establish maxmin and Bayesian foundation...
We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation (Manelli and Vincent...
Our goal is to describe the state of the art on Bayesian mechanisms when utility is transferable and...
We extend the principal/one-agent model with countervailing incentives to a framework in which the p...
Classical Bayesian mechanism design is “centralized”, that is, the designer is assumed to know the d...
When environments are 'rich', single-valued social choice functions which are implementabl...
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensio...
We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private inf...
© 2013 The Econometric Society. We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utiliti...
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensio...
We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gersh...
We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent'...
We introduce a perfect price discriminating mechanism for allocation problems with private informati...
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensio...
We study the equivalence between Bayes-Nash Incentive Compat-ibility (BIC) and Dominant Strategy Inc...
In private-value auction environments, Chung and Ely (2007) establish maxmin and Bayesian foundation...
We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation (Manelli and Vincent...
Our goal is to describe the state of the art on Bayesian mechanisms when utility is transferable and...
We extend the principal/one-agent model with countervailing incentives to a framework in which the p...
Classical Bayesian mechanism design is “centralized”, that is, the designer is assumed to know the d...
When environments are 'rich', single-valued social choice functions which are implementabl...