Add to ORKGAbstract. A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admis-sible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. 1
McGarvey (1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a rela...
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game)...
In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are supposed to be "absolutely powerful" whi...
Abstract. A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with...
A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect t...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
For each (individually rational) payoff configuration of a tu-game with a non-empty coalition struct...
LÁSZLO ́ Á.KÓCZY AND LUC LAUWERS Abstract. For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with ...
For each outcome (i.e. a payo# vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non...
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game)...
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game)...
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game)...
McGarvey (1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a rela...
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game)...
In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are supposed to be "absolutely powerful" whi...
Abstract. A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with...
A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect t...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
For each (individually rational) payoff configuration of a tu-game with a non-empty coalition struct...
LÁSZLO ́ Á.KÓCZY AND LUC LAUWERS Abstract. For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with ...
For each outcome (i.e. a payo# vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non...
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game)...
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game)...
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game)...
McGarvey (1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a rela...
This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game)...
In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are supposed to be "absolutely powerful" whi...