Competition

The paper argues that internal sub-state dynamics can systematically account for the variety of forms in which politicians organize cross-jurisdictional interaction in dual federal systems. Most generally, majoritarian executive-legislative relations tend to weaken the institutionalization of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), while power-sharing executive-legislative relations tend to facilitate it. Moreover, depending on the type of power-sharing mechanisms in the single arenas-non-compulsory or compulsory- the mutual integration of IGOs is rendered more or less difficult. The institutionalization of IGOs is affected by the following mechanisms: Firstly, given one-party majority cabinets, complete government alternations (which are much less likely given coalition or oversized governments) strongly alter actors ’ interest constellations over time, thereby increasing the costs of maintaining stable cross-boundary intergovernmental relations. Secondly, the heavy impact of a potential electoral loss induces politicians to shift the blame to the other governments in the system, thereby undermining the potential for cross-boundary cooperation. Thirdly, one-party governments (in contrast to coalitions) decrease the value of IGOs as instruments to save transaction costs because the number of involved actors is lower. Finally, autonomy losses caused by intergovernmental cooperation are higher for parties which govern alone