Add to ORKGLÁSZLO ́ Á.KÓCZY AND LUC LAUWERS Abstract. For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation- which we call enforceable dominance- is employed. 1
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition struct...
This paper studies the constraints in coalition formation that result from a hierarchical organizati...
For each outcome (i.e. a payo# vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non...
For each (individually rational) payoff configuration of a tu-game with a non-empty coalition struct...
Abstract. A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
McGarvey (1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a rela...
A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect t...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
The first chapter introduces the topic of coalition structures and stresses its importance and impac...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition struct...
This paper studies the constraints in coalition formation that result from a hierarchical organizati...
For each outcome (i.e. a payo# vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non...
For each (individually rational) payoff configuration of a tu-game with a non-empty coalition struct...
Abstract. A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
McGarvey (1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a rela...
A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect t...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
The first chapter introduces the topic of coalition structures and stresses its importance and impac...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition struct...
This paper studies the constraints in coalition formation that result from a hierarchical organizati...