Endogenous Enforcement and Jurisdiction in International Adjudication∗

Why do states build international courts, submit cases, and enforce court judg-ments? This paper examines the role of an international court in resolving inter-state disputes. The litigation process is costly and the court’s final judgment has no direct binding authority, yet states still submit cases in order to lock in fa-vorable bargaining positions for the future. This ‘lock in ’ process occurs because states can endogenously develop a reciprocal enforcement regime in which disin-terested states impose costly punishments for noncompliance. This ensures that they can profitably appeal to the court in the future. The analysis also examines why states accept jurisdiction and promote international courts. It finds that in legal systems characterized by strong enforcement regimes in which states fully comply with court judgments, weak states benefit the most from international courts and have the greatest incentives to invest in such institutions