Add to ORKGWe introduce a new dynamic framework to analyze two-sided matching interactions that occur repeatedly over time, such as teacher-student matching or hospital-intern markets in Britain. We propose a new dynamic concept of credible group stability and show that implementing a men-optimal stable matching in each period is credi-bly group-stable. The result holds for a women-optimal stable matching. A credibly group-stable dynamic matching is individually rational and immune to any defensible group deviations with an appropriate definition of defensibility. We obtain several policy implications for market design. Moreover, a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency is given for finitely repeated markets
One of the important functions of many markets and social processes is to match one kind of agent wi...
In two-sided matching markets, not every worker-firm (doctor-hospital) pair can match with each othe...
We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many to-many matching markets. We sho...
The static matching models have been applied to real-life markets such as hospital intern markets, s...
The static matching models have been applied to real-life markets such as hospital intern markets, s...
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with interdependent valuations and im-perfect inform...
The static matching models have been applied to real-life markets such as hospital intern markets, s...
Pairwise-stable matching mechanisms are practically used and per-form very well in the real world tw...
Complementarities pose problems in models of two-sided matching markets. This has been a longstandin...
Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if compleme...
We propose a solution to the conflict between fairness and efficiency in one-sided matching markets....
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
International audienceStable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical comb...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
One of the important functions of many markets and social processes is to match one kind of agent wi...
In two-sided matching markets, not every worker-firm (doctor-hospital) pair can match with each othe...
We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many to-many matching markets. We sho...
The static matching models have been applied to real-life markets such as hospital intern markets, s...
The static matching models have been applied to real-life markets such as hospital intern markets, s...
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with interdependent valuations and im-perfect inform...
The static matching models have been applied to real-life markets such as hospital intern markets, s...
Pairwise-stable matching mechanisms are practically used and per-form very well in the real world tw...
Complementarities pose problems in models of two-sided matching markets. This has been a longstandin...
Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if compleme...
We propose a solution to the conflict between fairness and efficiency in one-sided matching markets....
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
International audienceStable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical comb...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
One of the important functions of many markets and social processes is to match one kind of agent wi...
In two-sided matching markets, not every worker-firm (doctor-hospital) pair can match with each othe...
We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many to-many matching markets. We sho...