Signalling and the quest for regulation in British complementary medicine1

Regulation seeking is a central interest of regulatory economics. This paper addresses the issue from an economic historical perspective, considering the regulation of British osteopaths and chiropractors. The study of regulatory motivation requires more precise research questions: ‘Why was a particular form of regulation sought at the time? ’ It is suggested that the osteopaths ’ early campaign for regulation during the 1920s and ’30s did not have the objective of obtaining statutory regulation. Rather, it was instrumental in uniting various factions of qualified practitioners and moreover, used as a signalling device. The renewed osteopathic interest in statutory regulation in the 1980s is interpreted as a function of the changing effectiveness of market signalling. Accordingly, the problem of whether or not to regulate is analysed as a function of its economic context. Both complementary professions operate within the medical market characterised by asymmetrical information and their regulation can be thus understood as the control of market signals. The Osteopaths ’ choice of self-regulation is treated as a signal in its own right, being a part of the integrated ‘signalling mix’. This included upper class patronage, fashionable addresses of osteopathic practices, self-imposed restrictions on advertising, and the ‘cosmetics of professionalisation’—signals imitating those of the medical profession. Osteopaths continuously relied on upper class patronage, a common signalling device within the medical market