THE MARKETER AS A COMPETITION AGENT IN THE CHILEAN ELECTRIC MARKET

This work analyzes the consequences of allowing retail-level competitive commercialization and the conditions that must be satisfied to make that introduction to positively contribute to economic efficiency. The relevance of the issue is outstanding, because the figure of the marketer in the electric sector in the world is relatively new and recent experiences show ample benefits if they are adequately regulated. In particular, for the Chilean case, this is especially applicable, because while the regulation does not allow competition in the retailer stage, it considers energy savings incentives that allow the interaction between generators and regulated customers, generating spaces to introduce the marketer. To estimate the effects of competitive commercialization, a model based on the Cournot game theory is developed. With acceptable assumptions, the model allows comparing short and long-term wholesale prices in the case of a monopolistic distribution regulated with low competitive commercialization prices. The role of the competitive marketers has effects on prices that depend on their particular risk aversion. The work concludes that competitive commercialization can generate lower wholesale prices than the traditional regulated monopolistic commercialization if the marketer is able to efficiently influence the demand (i.e., through contract options)