§1 Two Dogmas

The literature on truthmaking is now almost a hundred years old. Throughout this period many friends of truthmaking have accepted two claims: D1 There are truths which have no truthmakers D2 Truth-makers are ontologically or metaphysically fundamental. In some cases they have explicitly endorsed these claims, in other cases they are implicitly committed to them. The two claims are dogmas and, as is the way with dogmas, are by no means independent. In §2 I put forward an alternative to the two dogmas and argue that it is to be preferred. My alternative to D1 is a version of truth-maker maximalism, TMM Every true truth-bearer has a truth-maker1, which is strengthened in two ways. First, I identify truth-bearers with propositions and truth-makers with obtaining states of affairs: TMMPS Every proposition that p which is true is made true by the obtaining state of affairs that p Secondly, I take TMMPS to flow from the nature of truth and of propositions: TME In virtue of the essence of propositions and of truth, every proposition that p which is true is made true by the obtaining of the state of affairs that p My alternative to D2 is the claim that the truth-makers isolated by (TME) are never ontologically fundamental. I must therefore explain what it is to be ontologically or metaphysically fundamental, provide some candidates for the role of what is ontologically fundamental, and elucidate the nature of truthmaking. What is the relation between (D1) and (D2)? 1 Truthmaker maximalism was endorsed by one of the first friends of truthmakers, the realist phenomenologis