In a Downsian model of political competition we compare the equilibrium tax and redistribution level obtained from two systems to \u85nance partiespolitical campaigns: the public and the private system. In the private system ideological voters make campaign contributions to increase the chances of winning of their preferred party. In the public system parties receive funds from the government. If voters are su ¢ ciently ideological the private system induces high aggregate spending. Nevertheless, it may be supported by a majority of voters given the indirect e¤ect contributions have on the equilibrium redistribution level and partiesprobability of winning
The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political com-petition how the private provision of...
This paper studies the typical European system for public funding of parties, where parties receive ...
We link the intensity of campaign competition in different electoral systems with the number of cand...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
This paper analyzes a political economy model of taxation in which political parties design the prov...
This paper studies the typical European system for public funding of parties, where parties receive ...
The distribution of direct public funding to political parties is based on two criteria: (1) perform...
This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parties receive public funds depending on their vote ...
We discuss political competition games between Left and Right parties, in which the policy space is ...
We study whether public campaign finance creates incentives for parties to adopt a moderate public s...
ference on Elections and Distribution at Yale University for their helpful comments. We develop a mo...
This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign cont...
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about thei...
The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political com-petition how the private provision of...
This paper studies the typical European system for public funding of parties, where parties receive ...
We link the intensity of campaign competition in different electoral systems with the number of cand...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
This paper analyzes a political economy model of taxation in which political parties design the prov...
This paper studies the typical European system for public funding of parties, where parties receive ...
The distribution of direct public funding to political parties is based on two criteria: (1) perform...
This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parties receive public funds depending on their vote ...
We discuss political competition games between Left and Right parties, in which the policy space is ...
We study whether public campaign finance creates incentives for parties to adopt a moderate public s...
ference on Elections and Distribution at Yale University for their helpful comments. We develop a mo...
This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign cont...
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about thei...
The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political com-petition how the private provision of...
This paper studies the typical European system for public funding of parties, where parties receive ...
We link the intensity of campaign competition in different electoral systems with the number of cand...