Add to ORKGSlantchev (2003, American Political Science Review, 97) studies a class of negotiation models to explain costly conflict between two completely informed nations. In one of his main propositions (Proposition 2.3), Slantchev provides a strategy profile to support the so−called extremal subgame perfect equilibrium, where one nation receives its lowest equilibrium payoff. By means of a counter example, we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium with one nation's payoffs below the strategy profile provided in his Propositio
Within the international system, states frequently fight even when opponents have little or nothing ...
Power is the fundamental determinant of international outcomes. It determines who gets what and at w...
Abstract: The opportunity to bargain often causes costs for at least one party in many economic situ...
Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The common ...
Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The common ...
Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The common ...
Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The commonr...
It is a prevalent view in International Relations scholarship that in conflicts the most powerful pa...
In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in ‘‘guns’’) that may...
Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as dynamic games in which parties have no commitment p...
This paper analyzes a general model of two-player bargaining in the shadow of war, where one player ...
In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in ``guns\u27\u27) th...
This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domes...
States who agree on their relative strenght and resolve can go a crisis due to mistakes in the negot...
States who agree on their relative strenght and resolve can go a crisis due to mistakes in the negot...
Within the international system, states frequently fight even when opponents have little or nothing ...
Power is the fundamental determinant of international outcomes. It determines who gets what and at w...
Abstract: The opportunity to bargain often causes costs for at least one party in many economic situ...
Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The common ...
Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The common ...
Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The common ...
Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The commonr...
It is a prevalent view in International Relations scholarship that in conflicts the most powerful pa...
In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in ‘‘guns’’) that may...
Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as dynamic games in which parties have no commitment p...
This paper analyzes a general model of two-player bargaining in the shadow of war, where one player ...
In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in ``guns\u27\u27) th...
This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domes...
States who agree on their relative strenght and resolve can go a crisis due to mistakes in the negot...
States who agree on their relative strenght and resolve can go a crisis due to mistakes in the negot...
Within the international system, states frequently fight even when opponents have little or nothing ...
Power is the fundamental determinant of international outcomes. It determines who gets what and at w...
Abstract: The opportunity to bargain often causes costs for at least one party in many economic situ...