Add to ORKGIntroducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling and comm...
The provision of global public goods, such as climate change mitigation and managing fisheries to av...
Many public goods cannot be provided directly by interested parties (e.g. citizens), as they entail ...
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations ...
Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with a...
Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with a...
Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with a...
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an expe...
This paper reports the results of a public good experiment with voting. The standard game in which s...
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an expe...
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an expe...
Substantial literature in public economics examines coordination in public goods games. We conduct a...
Many public goods cannot be provided directly by interested parties (e.g. citizens), as they entail ...
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an expe...
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an expe...
We introduce a binding unanimous voting rule to a public goods game with an uncertain threshold for ...
The provision of global public goods, such as climate change mitigation and managing fisheries to av...
Many public goods cannot be provided directly by interested parties (e.g. citizens), as they entail ...
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations ...
Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with a...
Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with a...
Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with a...
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an expe...
This paper reports the results of a public good experiment with voting. The standard game in which s...
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an expe...
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an expe...
Substantial literature in public economics examines coordination in public goods games. We conduct a...
Many public goods cannot be provided directly by interested parties (e.g. citizens), as they entail ...
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an expe...
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an expe...
We introduce a binding unanimous voting rule to a public goods game with an uncertain threshold for ...
The provision of global public goods, such as climate change mitigation and managing fisheries to av...
Many public goods cannot be provided directly by interested parties (e.g. citizens), as they entail ...
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations ...