We analyze an economy with banks and markets and uncover impli-cations of the presence of asset markets for the run-prone banking sector. Consumers can split their endowment between a market investment and a deposit contract which admits bank runs. Banks specialize in provid-ing ex ante liquidity insurance. Market investment acts as insurance if there is a run. Banks provide a higher degree of the liquidity insurance while facing a lower probability of a run when compared to the banks-only economy. As long as consumers invest in both the market and the deposit contract, the welfare is higher when compared to the economy with banks, or markets, alone
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
We study the welfare implications of self-fulfilling bank runs and liquidity require- ments, in a ne...
We model a dynamic economy in which two types of aggregate shocks are present. A liquidity shock a¤e...
We analyze an economy with banks and markets and uncover implications of the presence of asset marke...
This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange m...
Banks supply liquidity to insure individuals against possible short-term consumption shocks. The hig...
We develop an in\u85nite horizon macroeconomic model of banking that allows for liquidity mismatch a...
Banks supply liquidity to insure individuals against possible short-term consumption needs. The high...
We study a novel mechanism to explain the interaction between banks’ liquidity management and the em...
To study the relationship between bank runs and asset prices, we consider a banking model that incor...
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide an analytical framework of modern banking: The key role of banks i...
We study the welfare implications of self-fulfilling bank runs and liquidity requirements, in a grow...
In this paper we extend the Cooper and Ross (1998) analysis of the optimal response of a competitive...
This paper models information-induced and "pure-panic" runs in the banking system, in an environment...
We examine how banks and \u85nancial markets interact with one another to provide liquidity to inves...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
We study the welfare implications of self-fulfilling bank runs and liquidity require- ments, in a ne...
We model a dynamic economy in which two types of aggregate shocks are present. A liquidity shock a¤e...
We analyze an economy with banks and markets and uncover implications of the presence of asset marke...
This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange m...
Banks supply liquidity to insure individuals against possible short-term consumption shocks. The hig...
We develop an in\u85nite horizon macroeconomic model of banking that allows for liquidity mismatch a...
Banks supply liquidity to insure individuals against possible short-term consumption needs. The high...
We study a novel mechanism to explain the interaction between banks’ liquidity management and the em...
To study the relationship between bank runs and asset prices, we consider a banking model that incor...
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide an analytical framework of modern banking: The key role of banks i...
We study the welfare implications of self-fulfilling bank runs and liquidity requirements, in a grow...
In this paper we extend the Cooper and Ross (1998) analysis of the optimal response of a competitive...
This paper models information-induced and "pure-panic" runs in the banking system, in an environment...
We examine how banks and \u85nancial markets interact with one another to provide liquidity to inves...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
We study the welfare implications of self-fulfilling bank runs and liquidity require- ments, in a ne...
We model a dynamic economy in which two types of aggregate shocks are present. A liquidity shock a¤e...