c 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. When is buying votes wrong?

Abstract. In modern liberal democracies, offering individual voters in political elections mon-ey for their votes is wrong and illegal; offering groups of voters particular benefits in exchange for their votes is constitutionally protected. Voters do not sell their votes; instead, voters assign their votes to legislative representatives who sell or trade for them. Examining the role of coalition costs in political and corporate elections, we argue that these rules protect voters from themselves, from being compelled to approve proposals that leave them individually worse off. Simultaneously, these rules allow voters to seek particular benefits through collective organization and legislative representation. 1. Some paradoxes of vote buying The regulations governing vote buying in modern liberal democracies seem paradoxical. It is wrong and illegal to offer individual voters in political elec-tions money for their votes. It is, however, perfectly acceptable (or at least, constitutionally protected) to promise identifiable groups of voters particular benefits in exchange for their votes. To quote Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court, in his 1982 majority opinion in Brown v. Hartlage (456 US 56):1 We have never insisted that the franchise be exercised without taint of individual benefit; indeed, our tradition of political pluralism is partly predicated on the expectation that voters will pursue their individual good through the political process, and that the summation of these individual pursuits will further the collective welfare. So long as the hoped for ben-efit is to be achieved through the normal processes of government, an